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Abstract: What is Nietzsche’s place in the history of political thought? This article 
attempts to situate Nietzsche by contrasting him with two traditions: the social 
contract, in particular in its Hobbesian variety, which Nietzsche critically engages 
with in both ‘The Greek State’ and the Genealogy; and nineteenth century theories of 
the ‘withering away of the state’, which serve as an interesting counterpoint to 
Nietzsche’s own view of the ‘decay of the state’. In doing so, the article challenges the 
view that Nietzsche does not offer a theory of the state, and should therefore not be 
considered a political thinker of any kind. 
 
 
It has often been said that if Nietzsche expresses various views about the state, these 
do not amount to anything systematic enough to be considered a political theory. 
Brian Leiter, a prominent commentator on Nietzsche, has written that the 
‘interpretative question’ concerning Nietzsche’s political philosophy is whether 
‘scattered remarks and parenthetical outbursts add up to systematic views on questions 
of philosophical significance’. His own view is that Nietzsche ‘has no political 
philosophy, in the conventional sense of a theory of the state and its legitimacy’. If he 
‘occasionally expresses views about political matters…read in context, they do not 
add up to a theoretical account of any of the questions of political philosophy’. Leiter 
explains: ‘the canon of political philosophers is composed of thinkers (like Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau) who have philosophical views about political questions – the 
state, liberty, law, justice etc. – not thinkers whose views about other topics merely 
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have “implications” for politics’. Instead Nietzsche, for Leiter, is an ‘esoteric 
moralist’, someone who ‘has views about human flourishing, views he wants to 
communicate at least to a select few’, but for whom the ‘larger world, including its 
form of political and economic organisation, is simply not his concern’.2 
 By denying Nietzsche a reflexion on politics, Leiter places himself in a long 
line of interpreters stretching back to the end of World War II. The first, and perhaps 
still most prominent, was Walter Kaufmann. His seminal Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist, first published in 1950 and now in its fourth edition,
3
 rescued 
Nietzsche from the philosophical abyss he had fallen into after his misuse by the 
Nazis, which at the time had prompted Bertrand Russell to call the war ‘Nietzsche’s 
war’. Kaufmann reconstructed Nietzsche as a German humanist whose sole 
preoccupation was with an anti-political culture. But the price he paid for rescuing 
Nietzsche from the ‘philosophical bestiary’, as Alasdair MacIntyre described the place 
to which Nietzsche’s Übermensch had been consigned,4 was to deny him any interest 
in politics. 
 Kaufmann’s line of argumentation still serves as a cue for many readings of 
Nietzsche, providing a starting point for authors such as Bernard Williams and 
Alexander Nehamas, and remains a powerful strand of interpretation today.
5
 A 
number of different authors, including Keith Ansell-Pearson, Daniel Conway, Bruce 
Detwiler and Don Dombowsky, have more recently questioned such a view, but the 
position remains firmly entrench in the secondary literature.
6
 The aim of this article is 
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to contribute to this debate by approaching Nietzsche through one of the central 
themes of the history of political thought, namely that of the state. By adopting this 
perspective, it wishes to continue to challenge the view that Nietzsche held no interest 
in politics at all, and in doing so enrich the discussion about how his relation to 
political thought might best be understood.   
 An essential part of this approach is to pay particular attention to the context 
within which Nietzsche’s theory of the state emerged, namely a disagreement with 
Richard Wagner over the role of slavery in the ancient city-state. This will be the 
focus of the first part of the article. It will also be concerned with the contrast 
Nietzsche draws of his own account of the origins of the state and that of the social 
contract tradition, the latter of which he dismisses as a ‘fantasy’ in On the Genealogy 
of Morality.
7
 Yet in a youthful unpublished essay ‘The Greek State’, Nietzsche is 
quite clear that the state of nature is a Hobbesian ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’.8 
Unpacking the relationship between these two seemingly competing claims will be the 
task of the first part of the article.
9
  
In the second part I will turn my attention to Nietzsche’s theory of the ‘decay 
of the state’: a common theme in the history of political thought and, indeed, the 
nineteenth century. What must be made clear here is that when Nietzsche talks about 
the state in his work, he is in fact refereeing to three related but at the same time 
distinct instances, that follow chronologically. First is the ancient city-state, which 
Nietzsche lauds for providing the original platform for the development of high 
culture that could not have taken place beforehand. This state subsequently suffers a 
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transformation into the modern nationalist Kulturstaat, which Nietzsche virulently 
condemns for its instrumentalisation of culture for its own benefit, thereby inverting 
the initial mission which saw the birth of the state in the first place. But ultimately 
Nietzsche diagnoses the end of that state too – its ‘decay’ – and it is in this transition 
away from the modern nation-state, towards what we might term a post-modern state, 
that he will locate his political project.  
 My goal, then, is to argue that Nietzsche does offer a systematic political 
theory of the state, but one that is an alternative to the social contract tradition, which 
he explicitly rejects. In doing so, I intend to challenge those readings of Nietzsche that 
refuse any sustained or coherent thinking on politics on his behalf. Yet on the basis of 
his theory of the state’s decay, I will also posit that Nietzsche changes the focus of his 
interest in politics to a new problem of political philosophy, namely how to reconcile 
and re-establish normative and political authority in the transition away from the 
modern nation-state. This shows how Nietzsche is able to adapt his political thinking 
to his analysis of contemporary society, thus disproving the point that Nietzsche was 
unconcerned with his political and social context.  
 It is well known that Nietzsche writes in many different styles – the aphoristic 
being his most famous – and that, outside perhaps The Birth of Tragedy, The 
Genealogy of Morality, and The Antichrist, his books address many different themes, 
rather than being a sustained analysis of one particular subject. But this does not mean 
that he did not deal with political issues, or any philosophical topoi for that matter, in 
a thorough manner across the range of his writings. Nor does it imply that he did not 
devote particular essays or chapters to political topics.
10
 Whilst my article will focus 
primarily on Nietzsche’s earlier writings – ‘The Greek State’ (1872), Schopenhauer 
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as Educator (1874) and the chapter ‘A Glance at the State’ of Human, all too human 
(1878) in particular – by linking these texts to later ones such as On the Genealogy of 
Morality (1887) and Twilight of the Idols (1888), I desire to show Nietzsche’s 
sustained, and indeed quite coherent, interest in the state. I by no means desire to 
suggest that there are no breaks in the development of Nietzsche’s thought – I am 
sympathetic to the usual tripartite division of Nietzsche’s works, and Martin Ruehl 
has convincingly argued, to my mind, that ‘The Greek State’ signals the start of 
Nietzsche’s departure from his early Wagneriana11 – but I do want to posit that in 
terms of his political reflexion, in particular with regards to his view of the state, 
Nietzsche held quite consistent views throughout his productive life. 
 Nietzsche, therefore, by theorising three different states across his oeuvre, 
demonstrates a sustained interest in the topic of the state throughout his corpus. 
Moreover, that he draws together ‘The Greek State’ and the Genealogy on the subject 
of the birth of the state, and again Human, all too human and Twilight of the Idols on 
the matter of the modern’s state decay, suggests that there are in fact strong 
continuities in his conceptualisation of these three states over the course of his 
writings.  
 What drives the research behind this article is the question of identifying 
Nietzsche’s correct place in the canon of political thought. I aim to do so by 
positioning Nietzsche in relation to different traditions – the social contract, theories 
of the ‘decay of the state’ – in the history of political thought conventionally 
understood: my goal is to say something new about Nietzsche, not make a novel point 
about these traditions. Nietzsche has now became a staple of many political thought 
curricula, but the best manner to approach him – and indeed what best set text to use, 
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although this currently seems to have solidified around the Genealogy – is still a 
matter of contention. Through my work here I hope to begin to offer one fruitful way 
of doing so.  
 
 
I: Wagner and Slavery 
 
From the outset Nietzsche considered a political reflexion to be an integral part of his 
work. One of the working titles of what was to become The Birth of Tragedy (1872) 
was ‘Tragedy and Free Spirits: Meditations on the Ethical-Political Significance of the 
Music Drama’, and a chapter on the state and slavery was consistently planned from 
1869 to 1871.
12
 In early 1871 Nietzsche penned a long fragment on the theme,
13
 and 
the essay would be reproduced in near-identical form as the third of the ‘Five Prefaces 
to Five Unwritten Books’ he offered Cosima Wagner for Christmas 1872, entitled 
‘The Greek state’. Yet when the Birth was published earlier that year, Nietzsche had 
been reduced to merely ‘noting’ that ‘Alexandrian culture needs a slave-class in order 
to exist’.14 The chapter on state and slavery had disappeared. 
Martin Ruehl speculates that the chapter was purged at the behest of the 
‘Master’, Richard Wagner.15 Wagner’s influence on Nietzsche is fully recognised, but 
the impact Wagner’s political thought had on Nietzsche’s own political thinking has 
been under-explored, and I wish to rectify this here. Indeed, Cosima notes in her 
diaries that the first oral disagreement between Wagner and Nietzsche concerned the 
Franco-Prussian War: Nietzsche had expressed – as he would do in a more systematic 
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manner in his first Untimely Meditation – his anxiety about the threat posed to culture 
by the new militaristic Prussian state.
16
 In response to this Wagner, who had grown 
increasingly nationalistic, and had moved away from some of the more radical 
inclinations of his youth,
17
 proclaimed that he ‘approves everything: the police, the 
soldiers, the censored press, the stifling of the parliament’ in view of the Prussian 
victory and German unification.
18
 
In his early essay The Artwork of the Future (1849), which Nietzsche had been 
given to read upon his first visit to Tribschen in 1869, Wagner had argued that Greek 
culture had crumbled under slavery, and that the true artwork of the future could only 
come about through the liberation of the modern wage-labouring slave.
19
 Nietzsche, 
however, disagreed. Drawing from his earlier fragment, Nietzsche writes in ‘The 
Greek State’ that ‘even if it were true that the Greeks were ruined because they kept 
slaves, the opposite is even more certain, that we will be destroyed by the lack of 
slavery’.20 This was the ‘cruel-sounding truth’ he claimed to have identified in the 
essay, the fact that ‘slavery belongs to the essence of a culture’.21 
These sorts of passages did not sit well with Wagner, and after a visit to 
Tribschen from the 3-8 April 1871, where an early draft of the Birth was discussed 
with Cosima and Richard Wagner, the socio-political sections were dropped from 
Nietzsche’s subsequent reworkings of the book.22 It seems only someone like Wagner 
would have had a powerful enough influence on Nietzsche for him to change his 
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writings, and Nietzsche’s laudatory remarks about him in the conclusion to the Birth 
are well known. Yet what this episode shows is that just as Wagner’s mission to 
create a ‘total artwork’ required a ‘total revolution’ of both culture and politics, 
Nietzsche’s project contained from the beginning an essential socio-political element, 
which asserted the role of slavery in the creation of high culture but which was 
perhaps, however, suppressed out of deference to Wagner. The political element was 
to be found in the essay on ‘The Greek State’, which represents Nietzsche’s first 
systematisation of his early political views. That Nietzsche maintained his views on 
slavery, as expressed in his early draft for the Birth, is demonstrated by the fact that 
he offered an almost exact copy of the passage in question – ‘The Greek State’ – to 
Cosima less than a year after the publication of the Birth – a poisoned gift if there ever 
was one.   
In ‘The Greek state’ Nietzsche also takes issue with Wagner’s On State and 
Religion – another manuscript Nietzsche read whilst in Tribschen – which the latter 
had recently composed at the behest of King Ludwig II of Bavaria.
23
 There Wagner 
accounts for the emergence of the state as from a Hobbesian ‘fear of violence’, which 
leads to a ‘contract whereby the units seek to save themselves from mutual violence, 
through a little practice of restraint’.24 Whilst Nietzsche concurred that the state of 
nature was one of ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’,25 he disagreed with the idea that 
the state arose through a contract. Instead he saw the state as originating from a 
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‘conqueror with the iron hand’, who ‘suddenly, violently and bloodily’ takes control 
of a yet unformed population and forces it into a hierarchical society.
26
 
Nietzsche’s rejection of the social contract goes hand-in-hand with his 
affirmation of slavery: the contract would presuppose equality between pledgers and 
thus repudiate the slavery upon which Greek culture had come about, and which 
would again be needed, as Wagner denied, for true culture to be recreated. Indeed, 
Wagner posited the social contract as a means of freeing the modern wage-labouring 
slave and reconciling the warring classes within the bosom of the nation under the 
guidance of an enlightened and Christian king (read Ludwig II).
27
 This rejection of 
equality also sheds light on a common present-day rejection of Nietzsche as a political 
philosopher: as Nietzsche does not share the ‘egalitarian premise’ of contemporary 
political philosophy,
28
 he is therefore excluded from its ranks, notwithstanding 
Nietzsche’s own understanding of what politics might be. Whilst Nietzsche’s 
engagement with the social contract tradition emanates from a disagreement with 
Wagner concerning slavery, it also allowed him to build his own theory of the birth of 
the state and its justification, to which we now turn. 
 
 
II: The Greek State 
 
By referring to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in his discussion of what a political 
philosophy ought to be, Leiter appears to have in mind the social contract tradition 
when he defines political philosophy in the ‘conventional sense of a theory of the state 
and its legitimacy’. So at least one aspect of having a political philosophy on Leiter’s 
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terms – for the sake of this article I leave aside the question of having philosophical 
views about liberty, law, justice etc., although Nietzsche clearly has a lot to say about 
those too – is to have a philosophy of the state that takes the form of social contract 
theory. The publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1971, with its ‘original 
position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ which can be conceived of as being analogous to the 
‘state of nature’, has prompted a revival of the social contract tradition in the late 
twentieth century. But it is unfair to demand that all political philosophy, and in 
particular Nietzsche’s political philosophy, be judged on whether it meets this 
criterion, which in reality was challenged as early as the notion of the social contract 
itself.
29
 Indeed, much of what is important in political philosophy is the manner in 
which various thinkers have redefined the field. Hobbes notoriously did so by 
theorising the modern state, a concept unknown to the ancients. We should therefore 
be more attentive to the terms within which Nietzsche frames his contribution to 
political philosophy. Otherwise to dismiss him as a political thinker because he does 
not match a certain predetermined criterion not only conveniently sidelines him from 
the field, but moreover misses his actual original contribution to it.  
Leiter himself gets caught up in this problem. Although he criticises Martha 
Nussbaum in his work for requiring that ‘serious political thought’ address seven 
precise topics that would exclude Marx from the political philosophy canon – he 
writes that the ‘serious political thought’ Nussbaum has in mind is in fact ‘”serious” 
academic liberal political theory’ that ‘did not exist before the rise of a large class of 
bourgeois academics after World War II’30 – nonetheless he too re-imposes on 
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Nietzsche a modern understanding of political philosophy – the social contract – that 
would exclude someone like Plato, for whom the question of the (modern) state and 
its legitimacy had no meaning.
31
 
In ‘The Greek State’ Nietzsche concurred with the Hobbesian view of the state 
of nature being a ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’. But he did not account for its birth 
in a contract. Instead, as we just saw, he located the birth of the ‘cruel tool’ of the 
state in the iron ‘conquerors’. Indeed, these conquerors are themselves, on Nietzsche’s 
account, the state. Yet the ‘ignominious’ birth of the state is justified as a means to 
genius and culture. ‘Nature’ – we see the influence of Romanticism on Nietzsche’s 
early thought here – had instilled in the conqueror the state-creating instinct so that 
she might achieve ‘her salvation in appearance in the mirror of genius’.32 The 
‘dreadful’ birth of the state, whose monuments include ‘devastated lands, ruined 
towns, savage men, consuming hatred of nations’ is justified by nature because it 
serves as a means to genius. ‘The state appears before it proudly and calmly: leading 
the magnificently blossoming woman, Greek society, by the hand’.33 
Whilst Nietzsche’s genealogy of the state claims to be more realistic than the 
‘fanciful’, in his own words, account of the social contract tradition, this does not 
imply that on his account the state cannot be justified. Of course there is a difference 
between normative and descriptive claims here: Hobbes, and indeed Rousseau, gave 
over the course of their writings quite detailed accounts of the history of the state they 
understood to be at odds with the normative ideals they were recommending, and the 
social contract theorists are often thought of as having tailored their state of nature to 
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justify the type of state they were advocating.
34
 But Nietzsche is here rejecting both 
their descriptive – how the state came into being – and normative claims – how the 
birth of the state can be justified.  
The state, for Nietzsche, is justified because it opens up a space within which 
culture, through genius, can for the first time flourish.
35
 There are a number of 
elements to this claim. First, that the time and energy used to defend oneself in the 
‘war of all against all’ is redirected, within a pacified society, towards more artistic 
and cultural pursuits. Nietzsche explains that once states have been founded 
everywhere, the bellicose urge gets concentrated into ‘less frequent’ but altogether 
much stronger ‘bolts of thunder and flashes of lightning’ of ‘dreadful clouds of war 
between nations’. Thus, much as it was for Hobbes, the ‘state of nature’ gets 
transferred to the inter-state level. In the meantime, however, the ‘concentrated effect 
of that bellum, turned inwards, gives society time to germinate and turn green 
everywhere, so that it can let radiant blossoms of genius sprout forth as soon as 
warmer days come’. In other words, the energy that was used to simply stay alive in 
the individual war of all against all gets redirected, once encased in and protected by 
the new state, either collectively towards wars against other nations or, in the 
intermediary, towards satisfying a ‘new world of necessities’, namely culture.36  
The two interrelated justifications for the state – genius and culture – come 
together in the figure of the first genius, namely the military genius. Since the ‘beasts 
of prey’ were organised on a ‘war-footing’, the first type of state, even the ‘archetype’ 
of the state, is the military state, and the first genius a military genius. The first work 
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of art is the state itself and its constitution – Nietzsche mentions the Spartan lawgiver 
Lycurgus – a thought borrowed from Burckhardt.37 As a military state, the first state 
therefore divides itself into hierarchical military castes and this ‘war-like society’ 




 Nietzsche explains how the slave comes about: as the ‘beasts of prey’ are 
conquerors, they exercise what Nietzsche labels the ‘first right’: the right of power. 
All rights are fundamentally ‘presumption, usurpation and violence’ – a notion again 
taken from Burckhardt. Consequently, as the Greeks saw, the defeated ‘belong to the 
victor, together with his wife and child, goods and blood’: the masses who are formed 
into society become the slaves of the ‘beasts of prey’ because they have been 
conquered.
39
 Nevertheless, although they are conquered, their existence also becomes 
justified. As they form the flesh of the state, their slavery is justified as a means to the 
production of the genius. For Nietzsche true dignity is ‘being acknowledged as worthy 
to be a means for genius’.40 
 The slaves justify their existence as a means to genius by liberating the latter 
from having to physically work for their subsistence through taking on their share of 
the burden. This is the meaning of the cruel ‘truth-claim’ that Nietzsche makes in 
‘The Greek State’, that ‘slavery belongs to the essence of a culture’: 
In order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile soil for the development of art, 
the overwhelming majority has to be slavishly subjected to life’s necessity in 
the service of the minority, beyond the measure that is necessary for the 
individual. At their expense, through their extra work, that privileged class is 
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to be removed from the struggle for existence, in order to produce and satisfy a 




The extra work of the slaves liberates the artistic class from labouring for life’s 
necessities, so that they may dedicate themselves entirely to producing great works of 
art that justify the existence of the state, society, slaves and themselves as a whole. It 
is only a few exceptional beings – geniuses – who can produce art, the ‘small number 
of Olympian men’ who produce the ‘world of art’ by being placed on top of the 
‘misery of men living a life of toil’.42 In sum: slavery is a requisite for the existence of 
geniuses, who themselves are the only ones capable of producing high culture. 
This account of the birth and justification of the state in ‘The Greek State’ 
finds a distinct echo in the description of the state Nietzsche offers in second essay of 
the Genealogy. In the infamous passage on the notorious ‘blond beasts of prey’, 
themselves perhaps ‘conquerors with an iron fist’, Nietzsche writes: 
I used the word ‘state’: it is obvious who is meant by this – some pack of 
blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race, which, organised on a war 
footing, and with the power to organise, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws 
on the populace which, though it might be vastly greater in number, is still 
shapeless and shifting. In this way, the ‘state’ began on earth: I think I have 
dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a ‘contract’.43 
 
So for Nietzsche the ‘blond beasts of prey’ are themselves the state, much as were the 
‘iron conquerors’: once they have conquered and enslaved a people they become the 
‘repressive and ruthless machinery’ that shape the people into society. Later in the 
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same section he explains that ‘they arrive like fate’, that ‘their work is an instinctive 
creation of forms…They are the most involuntary and unconscious artists in 
existence. In them that terrible egoism of the artist is in control, which stares out like 
bronze and sees himself, in his work, eternally justified, just like a mother is in her 
child’. 
 Both ‘The Greek State’ and the Genealogy therefore present the same account 
of the birth and justification of the state, as a conquering horde who, organised on a 
war-footing, suddenly appear to established a hierarchical state which is their work of 
art, only justifiable as a whole, and within which the slaves’ repressed instincts are 
turned inwards. As ‘The Greek State’ was never published, Nietzsche thereby gives a 
public endorsement to his earlier views on the state, and thus both texts should be read 
side-by-side. Moreover, that Nietzsche should reiterate 15 years later exactly the same 
theory of the birth of the state suggests very strong continuities between at least 
Nietzsche’s earlier and later periods, conventionally understood, in terms of his view 
of the ancient state.  
We can now see Nietzsche’s specific engagement with the social contract 
tradition, which the Genealogy reinforces and again makes explicit, in particular his 
criticism of the Hobbesian position. The main point is that whilst Nietzsche does 
share in positing a primordial ‘war of all against all’ – and that, like Hobbes, this state 
of nature persists between constituted states – he rejects the notion that the state came 
about through a contract. Whereas the contractarians believe that the state arose, or 
should arise, from a contract between all members, Nietzsche views the state as a 





 For Nietzsche the state ‘begins with an act of violence’, whereas 
the Hobbesian social contract was thought up precisely to get away from this primal 
hostility, and for Locke and Rousseau the state of nature was not essentially violent in 
the first place.
45
 Indeed, we might add that there is a strong methodological difference 
here: whilst Hobbes clearly wanted to make a political intervention in his time, he 
nonetheless offers us an abstract and legalistic contract, whereas Nietzsche provides 
us with a genealogical account of the rise and transformation of the state, which he 
only attempts to define in its different historical contexts (‘only that which has not 
history can be defined’).46  
The fact that for Nietzsche a large slave-class is created in the process also 
goes directly against the tradition, for which a contract was meant to guarantee some 
degree of freedom for everyone, and not just to the conquering few as in Nietzsche’s 
account. Finally, nature’s intent in creating the state was, according to Nietzsche, to 
provide a means to genius and culture, in contrast to the social contract which was 
meant to allow people to live in harmony. These justify the state’s advent. But if the 
state is justified as a means to genius, Nietzsche takes this thought further and applies 
it to all aspects of life. The slaves who make up the society that the ‘beasts of prey’ 
have formed also become justified as means to genius and culture because it is 
through their extra work that the geniuses are liberated from life’s ‘necessities’ and 
can thereby pursue their artistic task. Not only the state but also mankind is justified 
as a means to genius. This gives a particular flavour to the famous line from the Birth 
that it is both ‘existence’ and the ‘world’ that are ‘eternally justified’.47 
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 Nietzsche can be considered to offer a ‘political philosophy’ as Leiter would 
have wanted it: he has a ‘theory of the state’, which finds its origin in the ‘blond 
beasts of prey’, and a ‘justification’ for it in being a means to genius and culture. It is, 
however, an alternative political philosophy to the social contract tradition. 
 
 
III: The Decay of the Modern State 
 
Nietzsche had placed his reflexion of the Greek state under the guise of ‘Plato’s 
perfect state’, namely The Republic.48 There he presents Plato as being the first to 
have discovered ‘through poetic intuition’ the ‘actual aim of the [Greek] state’, which 
was the ‘constantly renewed creation and preparation of the genius, compared with 
whom everything else is just a tool, aid and facilitator’. In the Platonic state we 
recognise the ‘wonderful grand hieroglyph of a profound secret study of the 
connection between state and genius’, which Nietzsche believes is in ‘eternal need to 
be interpreted’.49 So Plato is important for Nietzsche not because he offers a definition 
of the state as such, but because he is the first to perceive what the Ancient Greek 
state is truly about, namely the creation of genius. 
Reinterpreting this secret connection is precisely what Nietzsche sets out to do 
in his third Untimely Meditation, Schopenhauer as Educator. There he posits his 
dictum that “mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men 
– that and nothing else is its task”.50 This was, of course, the mission nature had 
ascribed to the state and its slave class. But in contrast to the Greek state, where both 
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the conquerors and slaves were simply the unconscious tools of nature – the ‘state-
creating instinct’ for the former51 – in the modern world mankind can arrive at a 
‘conscious awareness of its goal’, namely to ‘seek out and create the favourable 
conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence’.52 
Nietzsche will describe this mission Platonically, as having to institute Plato’s perfect 
state, where the creation of the genius is the conscious aim of the state: ‘the 
promotion of philosophy as the state understands it will one day have to be inspected 
to see whether the state understands it Platonically, which is to say as seriously and 
honestly as though its highest objective were to produce new Platos’.53  
This modern Platonic state in many ways represents Nietzsche’s perfect state. 
It is a state where the conscious goal of its organisation is to produce genius and 
culture. It should be emphasised that this agreement with Plato is a political 
agreement about how society should be structured, and not a philosophical agreement: 
Nietzsche rejects Plato’s ‘Good in itself’ as philosophy’s biggest error.54 The political 
consequence of this philosophical disagreement lies in the type of genius that should 
be created: Nietzsche criticises Plato for excluding the ‘artistic genius’ from the state 
(although he blames that on Socrates’ influence), allowing only for the ‘genius of 
wisdom and knowledge’ (the ‘Philosopher-Kings’), whereas the genius in all his 
manifestations should be promoted.
55
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The Greek state was not to last. Whilst nature had instilled in the ‘beasts of 
prey’ the ‘state instinct’, these instincts would eventually wane such that ‘men placed 
by birth…outside the instinct for nation and state’ would arise and come to ‘recognise 
the state only to the extent…[that it] be in their own interests’. These men gain great 
power over the state because they break away from the ‘unconscious intention of the 
state’ that holds sway over the conquerors, and through them the masses under their 
control, making them thereby ‘means for the state purpose’. Instead, they come to see 
the state consciously for what it is, namely a huge war-machine, and, rejecting the role 
nature had assigned to the state and themselves – of being means to genius – they 
selfishly start to view the state as a means for their own purposes. Nietzsche explains: 
‘all other citizens are in the dark about what nature intends for them with their state 
instinct, and follow blindly; only those who stand outside this know what they want 
from the state, and what the state ought to grant them’. From this, these ‘truly 
international, homeless, financial recluses’ learn to ‘misuse politics as an instrument 
of the stock exchange, and state and society as an apparatus for their own 
enrichment’.56 
 This rising self-awareness and instrumentalisation of the state signals the death 
of the ancient state and the birth of the modern one. The modern state would not, 
however, fulfil the Platonic mission Nietzsche had ascribed to it. The modern 
Kulturstaat – meaning the state’s novel and direct involvement in the promotion of 
cultural and education, notably through taking on the role of mass education through 
its public schools – is only interested in ‘setting free the spiritual forces of a 
generation just so far as they may be of use to existing institutions’, as Nietzsche 
outlines in Schopenhauer as Educator. ‘However loudly the state may proclaim its 
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services to cultures, it furthers culture in order to further itself’.57 In much the same 
way as the financial recluses instrumentalise the state for their own personal 
enrichment, the modern state applies the same logic to culture and instrumentalises it 
only in order to enhance itself. This must also be understood in the context of rising 
nationalism, where the state instrumentalised culture as a means of furthering its own 
national aggrandisement. As such, the mission to produce new Platos is replaced by a 
complex system of reward and coercion that ensures philosophy and philosophers 
remain subservient to the state. ‘Nothing stands so much in the way of the production 
and propagation of the great philosopher by nature as does the bad philosopher who 
works for the state’, Nietzsche decries, concluding with the damning accusation that 
the epitaph of university philosophy will read “it disturbed nobody”.58 
If the Greek state was not to last, nor would the modern one. In an important 
aphorism of Human, all too human, entitled ‘Religion and government’, he writes that 
‘a later generation will also see the state shrink to insignificance in various parts of the 
earth’. The reason for this is that ‘modern democracy is the historical form of the 
decay of the state’.59 
 Nietzsche explains: ‘the interests of tutelary government and the interests of 
religion go hand in hand together, so that when the latter begins to die out the 
foundations of the state are also undermined’.60 The ‘belief in a divine order in the 
realm of politics’ is of ‘religious origin’ – the Greek state had itself arisen through 
some form of ‘magic’61 – so if religion disappears then ‘the state will unavoidably 
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lose its ancient Isis veil and cease to excite reverence’.62 This is what happens when a 
‘quite different conception of government’, namely democracy, begins to prevail, 
such that government is no longer understood as an ‘Above in relation to a Below’, 
but merely the ‘instrument of the popular will’. The result is that in the democratic 
conception of government, religion must simply follow the desires of the people, be 
another one of its ‘organs’, rather than the prerogative of the priestly class. As religion 
can no longer provide the support to the state that it once did, the previously 
reinforcing relationship between the government and the priests also breaks down, to 
be replaced by nationalism and the instruentalisation of culture.
63
 As such, ‘the 




In this new cold light the ‘individual will see only that side of [the state] that 
promises to be useful or threatens to be harmful to him’ – the instrumentalisation 
theme is here continued – and so will ‘bend all his efforts to acquiring influence upon 
it’. But this competition will quickly become too great, and will result in the 
fragmentation of the political community. ‘Men and parties’ will alternate too quickly, 
hurling ‘one another too fiercely down from the hill after barely having attained the 
top’. ‘No one will feel towards the law any greater obligation than that of bowing for 
the moment to the force that backs up the law’, whilst one will set out at once to 
‘subvert it with a new force, the creation of a new majority’.65 
Nietzsche concludes by proclaiming ‘with certainty’ that ‘distrust of all 
government’ will result from the ‘uselessness and destructiveness of these short-
winded struggles’, and will ‘impel men to a quite novel resolve: the resolve to do 
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away with the concept of the state, to abolish the distinction between public and 
private’. Instead, an ‘invention more suited to their purpose than the state was will 
gain victory over the state’. ‘Private companies’ (Privatgesellschaften), will ‘step by 
step absorb the business of the state’, including those activities which are the ‘most 
resistant remainder of what was formerly the work of the government’, namely that of 
protecting ‘the private person from the private person’.66 
Nietzsche seems rather unperturbed by this future development, and, putting it 
into a historical perspective, asks ‘how many an organising power has mankind not 
seen die out?’, mentioning the ‘racial clan’, which was far mightier than the ‘family’ 
and even ‘ruled and regulated long before the family existed’. In reality Nietzsche 
seems quietly optimistic about these future prospects. For one, “the prudence and self-
interests of men” are the qualities that are best developed by this process of 
attempting to control the state, such that ‘if the state is no longer equal to the demands 
of these forces then the last thing that will ensue is chaos’. However, he is not so bold 
as to recommend actively working for the dissolution of the state: to do so would 
require having a ‘very presumptuous idea of one’s own intelligence and scarcely half 
an understanding of history’. Instead, he recommends that we place our trust in the 
“prudence and self-interest of men” who can ‘preserve the existence of the state for 
some time yet’ and successfully steer humanity towards a more suitable invention. 
But ultimately Nietzsche contends that once the historical mission of the democratic 
conception of the state is accomplished, ‘a new page will be turned in the storybook 
of humanity in which there will be many strange tales to read and perhaps some of 
them good ones’.67 







Human, all too human belongs to Nietzsche’s so-called ‘middle’ or critical 
period – conventionally seen to stretch from Human, all too human to the fourth book 
of The Gay Science
68
 – where it is often asked whether Nietzsche is in fact expressing 
his own views, or whether he is adopting that of an impartial, and experimental, 
spectator. Whilst in certain contexts I am sympathetic to these claims, in terms of 
Nietzsche’s views of the state there is good reason to believe that those he expresses 
in this period are genuinely his. The most telling is that he explicitly quotes this 
section from Human, all too human in Twilight of the Idols, one of his last texts: ‘in 
Human, all too human (I, 472) I already characterised modern democracy (together 
with its hybrid forms like the “Reich”) as the state’s form of decline’.69 Moreover he 
also noted down the concept a number of times in his unpublished fragments between 
1883 and 1885.
70
 For me, the repeated insistence on this notion on Nietzsche’s behalf 
gives it an air of finality concerning his verdict on the modern state, and suggests in 
this context, much as it was with his views of the ancient state as he developed across 
‘The Greek State’ and the Genealogy, a strong continuity between his earlier and later 
views on the matter of the modern state and its decay.  
 
 
IV: Beyond the Modern State 
 
Basing herself on the Human, all too human passage just discussed, Tamsin Shaw has 
recently argued that the reason Nietzsche does not articulate a ‘positive, normative 
political theory’ is because he is a political sceptic. For her, Nietzsche’s ‘guiding 
political vision’ is ‘oriented around the rise of the modern state, which requires 
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normative consensus in order to rule, and a simultaneous process of secularisation that 
seems to make uncoerced consensus impossible’. In secular times the increased 
diversity of viewpoints results in the impossibility of locating and recognising 
normative authority. Whilst the state has the ‘ideological capacity’ to manufacture a 
normative consensus, notably through arrogating to itself the instruments of education 
and culture as we saw above, this consensus cannot hold in the long run: the state 
cannot rule through direct coercion alone, it needs to be perceived as “legitimate”. 
Nietzsche is thus a political sceptic, according to Shaw, because he cannot see how in 
the modern world we can ‘reconcile our need for normative authority with our need 
for political authority’.71 
 Shaw is absolutely correct in stating that for Nietzsche the modern state can no 
longer claim, in a secularised world, the normative authority religion once afforded it, 
and that consequently its political authority is undermined. However, the passage in 
question should not lead us to conclude that Nietzsche is a political sceptic, in the 
sense that he cannot see how we can ‘reconcile our need for normative authority with 
our need for political authority’. Simply put, Nietzsche does believe these two 
authorities can be married again, but that this will happen outside of the modern state-
structure which, as I have emphasised above, is in decline and in the process of being 
replaced by more ‘innovative’ and better-suited institutions. 
Shaw downplays this latter point, writing that ‘although Nietzsche speculates, 
in passing, about what a world without states would be like, he accepts that political 
agency in the modern world is concentrated in them’, noting that ‘in HH 472 he 
speculates that in the absence of religion the state as a form of political organisation 
might die out. He warns against any rash political experiments that would hasten this 
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process’.72 But the decay of the state is not something Nietzsche speculates about ‘in 
passing’: it is the essential point of the aphorism. With the rise of modern democracy 
the state will inevitably decay. If he recommends that we put our faith in “the 
prudence and self-interest of men” to ‘preserve the existence of the state from some 
time yet’, this is to ensure that the process does not descend into chaos and that the 
heightened senses of the prudential men this evolution produces are fully able to 
create better-suiting and more innovative institutions. He is in no way suggesting that 
the process of the dissolution of the state be halted, or that we return to a status quo 
ante, where the state was in league with the priestly class. Rather he is looking 
forward to reading the ‘strange tales’ that will appear in the ‘storybook of humanity’ 
once the modern state has disappeared, hoping that there will be some ‘good ones’.73 
 There is no reason to believe that political agency must solely be located in the 
modern state, and Nietzsche does not hold such a view. Instead, he locates his 
political project in the transition away from the nation-state. Indeed, the decay of the 
state signals the superseding of the modern question of political philosophy as framed 
by Leiter, namely that of the ‘theory of the state and its legitimacy’. The new question 
for Nietzsche will revolve around determining which institutions can fulfil the 
Platonic mission of producing new Platos the ‘Culture-State’ failed to achieve. 
 It is in extra-state institutions that Nietzsche believes this mission can be 
accomplished, and that a degree of normative authority can be re-established within 
them. Signalling his move to a standpoint outside of the modern state structure in 
Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche proposes that a ‘higher tribunal’ should be 
created outside the universities, devoid of official authority, and without salaries or 
honours, whose ‘function would be to supervise and judge these institutions in regard 
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to the education they are promoting’.74 In this way philosophy can regain its 
independence, and would be able to ensure that philosophy is taught at the universities 
with its true aim restored: to produce philosophical geniuses. 
For those of the ‘smaller band’ who will follow this path to true culture, 
Nietzsche explains that the institution they require would have ‘quite a different 
purpose to fulfil’. It would have to be a ‘firm organisation’ that prevents them from 
‘being washed away and dispersed by the tremendous crowd’; to ‘die from premature 
exhaustion or even become alienated from their great task’. This is to enable the 
completion of their task – preparing ‘within themselves and around them for the birth 
of the genius and the ripening of his work’ – through their ‘continual purification and 
mutual support’, and their ‘sense of staying together’.75 Nietzsche insists that 
one thing above all is certain: these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; 
on the contrary, they set one in the midst of a mighty community held 
together, not by external forms and regulations, but by a fundamental idea. It 




His insistence on the community – instead of the individual – in carrying out the 
mission of culture seriously challenges the view put forward by Kaufmann, Leiter and 
Williams amongst others that Nietzsche’s writings are destined solely for the solitary 
thinker cut off from the rest of the world.  
This ‘new institution’ that will defend culture is the intellectual counterpart to 
the ‘private companies’ that will slowly start taking over the role of the state. Here we 
see Nietzsche adapting his continued goal of producing genius and high culture – new 
Platos – to his analysis of the decline of the modern state, thereby demonstrating his 
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grasp, contra Leiter, of the socio-political context of the time, and his ability to draw 
out the consequences of this understanding for his cultural ideal. It is to this group that 
Nietzsche will ascribe the ‘expert normative authority’ Shaw doubts can appear. The 
question of how to combine expert normative authority with political authority 
remains unresolved for now, but I have argued elsewhere that the best way to think 
about this is through Nietzsche’s reconceptualisation of the notion of ‘Great politics’, 
in particular his call in his last writings and notes for the foundation of a ‘Party of 
life’, which will fight a ‘war of spirits’ against its opposing ‘Party of Christianity’ to 
establish a sufficient space within a democratic society for those who are called to this 
path of culture to pursue their mission. 
 In this article I have endeavoured to bring to the fore the – to my mind – 
underexplored influence Wagner had on Nietzsche’s political thinking, and that issue 
arises again here. Whilst previously I underlined how Nietzsche diverged from 
Wagner’s account of slavery in ancient Greece, the impact Wagner’s own account of 
the decay of the modern state had on Nietzsche’s thinking on the matter is patent. 
Returning to The Artwork of the Future, one of Wagner’s earlier writings and thus 
permeated by his then more anarchistic leanings, Wagner had opposed the modern 
state, which he saw as a ‘most unnatural unions of fellow men’, called into existence 
by mere ‘external caprice, e.g. dynastic interests’ that yoked together a certain number 
of men ‘once and for all’. Against this, he proposed a vision of a more fluid society in 
which people would come together in ‘special unions’ to carry out certain projects – 
unions to be disbanded once the task completed. These unions will ‘ever shape 
themselves anew, proclaim more complex and vivacious change, the more do they 
proceed from higher, universal, spiritual needs’. The only lasting union that Wagner 
envisages is of the ‘material sort’, rooted in the ‘common ground and soil’, that arise 
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to satisfy the needs that all men have in common, the sum total of which represents 
‘the great association of all Mankind’. The driving force behind these ‘special unions’ 
for Wagner is the ‘Volkish Want’.77  
In his ‘Religion and government’ passage from Human, all too human, 
Nietzsche, also rejecting the modern state, transforms this ‘Volkish Want’ into a 
democratic will, which sounds the death-knell of the modern state, and Wagner’s 
notion of ‘special unions’, grounded in both material and spiritual needs, is recast as 
the ‘private companies’ which will take over the work of the state. Perhaps of most 
interest is that Wagner gives an image of how the cultural version of his special 
unions are to be organised, and from this we can infer how Nietzsche’s own spiritual 
‘new institutions’ might work. The key is understanding the relationship the 
‘Darsteller’ entertains with the ‘fellowship of all the artists’ (note again the 
communal aspect to the enterprise): all the ‘lonely one’ can do is ‘prefigure [the 
artwork of the future] to himself’, but it will remain an ‘idle fancy’ if it is not brought 
to life by the fellowship, the only entity to be able to do so through a common 
striving.
78
 Once the Darsteller is invested with an idea, he raises himself to the 
position of poet, or the ‘artistic legislator’, by convincing the other free members of 
the fellowship of his idea and thereby takes on its ‘dictatorship’ until the completion 
of the project. Wagner emphasises that once the project is completed, the poet-dictator 
– a position open to anyone in the congregation – must return to the fold of the 
fellowship: the function of the lawgiver is always ‘periodic’, and his rule can never be 
extended to ‘all occasions’.79 
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Wagner allows us to put into place the final piece of the jigsaw that is Nietzsche’s 
theory of the birth and decay of the state. I think the correct way of conceptualising 
this transition is not to see it as the death of the state tout court, but rather as it going 
through a number of different transformations – or revaluations, to use a more 
Nietzschean term – from ancient state where its role was to serve as a means to 
culture, to the modern nation-state which appropriated culture for its own sake, to 
finally a much more decentralised, minimalist, regulatory, post-national one. The key 
here is to keep in mind that Nietzsche differentiates the state from that which he calls 
the ‘business of the state’, namely the work of government, which for him includes 
‘protecting the private person from the private person’, and this will be taken up by 
private contractors.
80
 This new entity will retain a relationship to the coercion that 
gave birth to it, although certainly in a less direct, more regulatory, way. With Wagner 
we can also see that it will have a European or indeed world-wide scope – ‘the great 
association of all Mankind’, which chimes well with Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘Good 
European’ and his rejection of the nationalist modern state81 – but it will still be 
rooted in the need for material cooperation, allowing for a freer play of different 
institutions within this framework. In sum: Nietzsche’s post-modern state will take the 
form of a European-wide decentralised and regulatory state, within which different 
institutions will be allowed freer rein to pursue their respective activities, some – the 
‘private companies’, probably the vast majority – for private gain within a broader 
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Nietzsche was not the only one to prophesise the state’s decay in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. But the originality of his theory is twofold. First, his 
idea of the decay of the state is linked to his later, more infamous, statement about the 
‘death of God’:83 once the religious foundation of the state called into question, the 
state can no longer support itself and this will lead to its inevitable dissolution. Here 
we see Nietzsche relating his philosophical insights to an account of modern society. 
Second, Nietzsche sees democracy, or the democratic will, as the catalyst for the 
fragmentation and final disintegration of the state. Thus, in contrast to Marxism where 
democracy is the result of the proletariat overthrow of the state, in Nietzsche’s 
account democracy is the cause of the state’s ‘withering away’.84 That being said, we 
might draw an analogy between the idea of a permanent material union and the notion 
of the ‘administration of things’, although in Nietzsche’s case this union is not as 
democratic as the Marxists would have wanted, as I shall now turn to.
85
 Nor would 
Nietzsche have had any sympathy with Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinist theory of 
the collapse of the state into political economy through a gradual self-disciplining of 
society, as elaborated in Social Statics,
86
 which he saw as the victory of the herd.
87
 
                                                 
82
 On this European dimension see S. Elbe, Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective (London, 2003) and D. 
Conway ‘Whither the “Good Europeans”?: Nietzsche’s New World Order’ in South Central Review 26, 
No. 3, 2009, pp. 40-60. 
83
 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge, 2007) #125. 
84
 For Nietzsche’s (lack of) knowledge of Marx, see T. Brobjer, ‘Nietzsche’s Knowledge of Marx and 
Marxism’, Nietzsche-Studien, 31 (2002), pp. 298-313. Nietzsche’s knowledge of socialist thought was 
often mediated through Wagner. 
85
 I am aware that in its original Saint-Simonean formulation it is not democratic either. 
86
 See J. W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven, 2000), pp. 73-
7. On Nietzsche’s knowledge of Darwinism, see J. Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (Oxford, 
2008). 
87
 TI, “Skirmishes”, # 14 “Anti-Darwin”:  “Assuming…that there is such a struggle for existence…its 
result is unfortunately the opposite of what Darwin's school desires…The species do not grow in 
perfection: the weak prevail over the strong again and again, for they are the great majority”. 
31 
 
  In Nietzsche’s post-modern state future political hierarchy will still be a fact 
of life, much as it was in the Greek state and in his perfect Platonic state: both in the 
internal structuring of the ‘new institutions’ – as we saw with the poet-dictator – and 
in the relationship these institutions entertain with the outside world, which will 
demand a transfer of resources to them so that they may fulfil their cultural mission, 
much in the same way the slaves provided for the Olympian men in ‘The Greek 
State’, although on a new basis.88 Indeed, for Nietzsche hierarchy is a fundamental 
and inescapable aspect of society. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886) he writes: ‘as long 
as there have been people, there have been herds of people as well, and a very large 
number of people who obey comparatively few who command’. He continues: ‘so, 
considering the fact that humanity has been the best and most long-standing breeding 
ground for the cultivation of obedience so far, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
average person has an innate need to obey as a type of formal conscience that 
commands’.89 Zarathustra (1885) echoes: ‘wherever I found the living, there too I 
heard the speech of obedience. All living is obeying. And this is the second thing that 
I heard: the one who cannot obey himself is commanded. Such is the nature of the 
living’.90 
 Whilst the modern state may have lost its ‘legitimacy’, it is through this more 
ancient idea of an enduring instinct of commanding and obeying that Nietzsche 
desires to see authority restored. First intellectual authority in the ‘new institutions’ he 
proposes must be restored. Then these institutions, metamorphosed into the ‘Party of 
life’, must secure political authority through the same means of commanding and 
obeying and through fighting a ‘war of spirits’ against its opposing ‘Party of 
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Christianity’.91 The future, according to Nietzsche, lies with those bold enough to 
attempt to command peoples again as they were in the past, and as they have always 
been. ‘Who can command, who must obey – here it is tried!’, Zarathustra proclaims. 
‘Human society: it is an experiment, this I teach – a long search: but it searches for the 
commander! – an experiment, oh my brothers! And not a “contract”!’.92 If for 
Nietzsche the state did not arise through a contract, neither will his post-modern state 
ideal. 
                                                 
91
 F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. J. Norman (Cambridge, 2007) “Destiny”, #1. 
92
 Z, III, “Tables”, #25. See also GM, II, #17: ‘He who can command, who is naturally a 
“master”…what has he to do with contracts!’. 
